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Abstract— This paper investigate the effectiveness of a passive 
radar for enhancing the security level in small airports and private 
runways. Specifically WiFi transmissions are parasitically 
exploited to perform detection and localization of non-cooperative 
targets that can be occupying the runway and the surrounding 
areas. Targets of interest include light/ultralight aircrafts, 
vehicles, people and even animals that may intrude onto the 
runways either intentionally or accidentally. The experimental 
results obtained by means of an experimental setup developed at 
SAPIENZA University of Rome prove the successful applicability 
of the proposed approach for small airports surveillance.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays exist a huge number of small, privately owned 
and unlicensed airfields around the world. Private aircraft 
owners mainly use these “airports” for recreational, single-
person or private flights for small groups and training flight 
purposes. In addition, residential airparks have proliferated in 
recent years, especially in the US, Canada, and South Africa. A 
residential airpark, or “fly-in community”, features common 
airstrips where homes with attached hangars allow owners to 
taxi from their hangar to a shared runway. In many cases, roads 
are dual-use for both, cars and planes [1].   
Typically, ultralight airfields, small private runways, and 
even airparks, are usually devoid of conventional technologies 
adopted to guarantee safety and security in large aerodromes, 
there including navigation aids, signs and lighting. The use of 
the runways is usually limited to the daylight hours and mostly 
controlled by dedicated operators equipped with radio 
transceivers in the HF/VHF band to communicate with the pilots 
of the aircrafts. These are expected to be cooperative, expert, and 
well-intentioned users, and to adhere to basic procedures during 
landing/taking off, taxiing, etc. The operator visually verifies 
that the runway is empty before authorizing an interested user to 
occupy it. 
Depending on the length of the runways and visibility 
conditions, several operators might be required to monitor the 
whole area of interest in order to avoid runway incursions by 
other aircrafts, vehicles, people, and even animals. In this regard, 
it is worth mentioning that many of the considered “small 
airports” are rarely enclosed in a monitored perimeter (e.g. 
barrier, fencing, etc.) and the edges between runways and 
taxiways are not clearly indicated. Therefore, it is possible that 
vehicles or beings intrude onto the runways either intentionally 
or accidentally. In addition, it would be desirable to monitor the 
airstrips and neighboring zones also when they are not being 
used by conventional users (i.e. night-hours, closing times, etc.) 
in order to avoid an illicit use by ill-intentioned persons. 
Obviously, the probability of accidents could be significantly 
reduced if an automatic control is implemented on the activities 
that occur on the runway and in neighboring zones. 
 In such scenarios, it would be of great potential interest the 
possibility to employ low-cost, compact, non-intrusive, and non-
transmitting sensors as a way to improve safety and security 
with limited impact on the airstrips users. Specifically the 
opportunistic exploitation of transmissions for networking 
(WiFi, WiMAX, LTE, etc.) is especially attractive since they 
have been proliferating at a very rapid rate for both commercial 
and private use and nowadays represent a widely accessible 
source of opportunity [2]-[6].  
Among them, the IEEE 802.11 Standard based (WiFi) 
transmissions seem to be an appropriate choice in the considered 
scenarios. Basically, even though they do not feature real 
terminals, airstrips owners eventually began to offer services 
and facilities to its users. These typically include the WiFi 
connection that sometimes is also adopted for pre-flight briefing. 
Based on the passive radar (PR) principle, the same WiFi access 
point might be exploited to provide the required radar 
surveillance capability in the area of interest. 
The possibility to exploit such a ubiquitous and easily 
accessible source has been shown to be an appropriate choice 
for the detection, localization and imaging of vehicles and 
human beings within short ranges using the passive radar 
principle [7]-[10]. Moreover, the feasibility of uncooperatively 
and covertly detecting people through the walls has been 
investigated in [11].  
In this paper, the potential exploitation of WiFi-based PR 
systems is investigated with reference to a real-world civil 
application. In particular, we consider the monitoring 
application of small private airstrips or airfields. With this 
terminology we refer to open areas designated for the taking-off 
and landing of small aircrafts, but which, unlike an airport, have 
generally short and possibly unpaved runways and do not 
necessarily have terminals. We report the results obtained in a 
 test campaign performed in a small private airfield for 
light/ultralight airplanes. Aircrafts and people have been 
employed as targets of opportunity to simulate different 
operative conditions of interest. The results obtained with the 
conceived sensor support the practical applicability of the WiFi-
based passive radar concept for improving safety and security of 
small private airfields. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II illustrate the 
performed test campaign, the receiver architecture and the signal 
processing scheme adopted for the results reported in this paper. 
The results obtained with different experimental tests are 
reported in Section III. Finally, our conclusions are drawn in 
Section IV. 
II. ACQUISITION CAMPAIGN AND WIFI-BASED PR SET-UP 
In this paper we report the results obtained in the test 
campaign performed in a small airfield named “Aviosuperficie 
Monti della Tolfa” [12] located in Santa Severa (about 60km 
North of Rome). Fig. 1 reports an aerial view of the airfield area. 
The airfield is only used for recreational and training flight 
purposes. It features a single runway, 520 meters long and 20 
meters wide, with a grass surface. Depending on wind direction, 
take-offs and landings are performed with heading 120° or 300° 
w.r.t. North.  
A. WiFi-based PR receiver architecture 
The considered data set has been collected by means of the 
experimental WiFi-based PR receiver sketched in Fig. 2, [13].  
A commercial WiFi access point (D-Link DAP 1160) is used 
as transmitter of opportunity. Its output is connected to the 
transmitting antenna while a directional coupler is used to send 
a -20 dB copy of the transmitted signal (the reference signal) to 
the first rx channel of the four-channel PR receiver. The router 
was configured to transmit in channel 7 of the WiFi band (2442 
MHz). It was set up to roam for connected devices emitting a 
regular Beacon signal exploiting a DSSS modulation at 3 ms 
intervals. Other two rx channels are connected to commercial 
WiFi panel antennas (sizes 33x9.3x2.07 cm) to collect the 
surveillance signals; the employed antennas are characterized by 
a gain of 12 dBi, a front-to-back ratio of 15 dB and beamwidths 
equal to about 80° and 23° on the horizontal and the vertical 
plane, respectively. The surveillance antennas were mounted at 
a height of about 1.6 meters from ground, about 40 cm below 
the transmitting antenna, in a quasi-monostatic configuration 
(see Fig. 2), and they were pointed at 345° w.r.t. North. 
Moreover, they were displaced in the horizontal direction by 12 
cm, which gives a 45° ambiguity for the target Direction of 
Arrival (DoA) estimation, based on an interferometric approach. 
The system architecture is based on the homodyne receiver 
scheme (see dashed line in Fig. 2). After an amplification stage 
(low noise amplifier with gain of 15 dB and noise figure of 0.8 
dB), the signals collected at the different receiving channels are 
down-converted from RF to BB by an I&Q quadrature 
demodulator that provides to the A/D converter the signals 
splitted into I and Q paths. In particular, the I&Q demodulators 
are simultaneously fed by the same local oscillator (LO) signal 
properly distributed by a four-way splitter. Then the A/D 
conversion is performed by means of the X3-10M data-capture 
(by Innovative Integration) with sampling frequency of 22 MHz. 
This is an XMC IO module featuring eight simultaneously 
sampled 16-bit, 25 MSPS A/D channels designed for high speed 
data acquisition applications. Finally, the acquired data are 
stored for off-line processing.   
B. WiFi-based PR processing scheme 
The WiFi-based PR processing scheme presented in [7],[10] 
is applied against the surveillance signals. In particular, the 
removal of undesired contributions is performed with the sliding 
version of the extensive cancellation algorithm (ECA-S) [14] 
over a range of 600 m with a batch duration equal to 0.2 s 
whereas the filter update rate is equal to the beacon emission rate 
of the exploited access point. A Coherent Processing Interval 
(CPI) of 0.3 s is then used to evaluate the bistatic range-velocity 
map over consecutive portions of the acquired signals with a 
fixed displacement of 0.1 s and target detection is performed by 
resorting to a standard cell-average CFAR threshold with 
probability of false alarm equal to 10−4. Then, a two-out-of-two 
detection criterion is adopted for the two surveillance channels 
which allows to collect a set of bistatic range and Doppler 
frequency measurements and to reduce the number of false 
alarms. As an example, for the  case of an test with two targets 
which will be shown in the next section (Fig. 5), in Fig. 3 are 
reported in ‘x’ markers all the plot collected over the whole 
acquisition time. In order to reduce the false alarms while 
yielding more accurate range/velocity measurements, a 
conventional Kalman tracking algorithm over the bistatic 
range/velocity plane has been applied. Specifically, in Fig. 3 the 
sequence of green and blue dotted markers represents the first 
and the second formed tracks, respectively. We observe that the 
above processing scheme allows to continuously detected and 
accurately tracked both targets although they have different 
Fig. 1. Scenarios of potential interest in small private airfield monitoring 
application. 
Fig. 2. WiFi-based PR receiver. 
 velocities. Finally, the phase difference between the two 
receivers measured at the target detection point is exploited to 
obtain the target DOA estimation. In fact, target 2D localization 
in local Cartesian coordinates can be obtained by exploiting the 
range and DOA measurements provided by the two horizontally 
displaced surveillance antennas [8].  
Several tests of about 20 s have been performed and some 
examples are reported in the following section. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The first two tests employed a small aircraft as a cooperative 
target [Fig. 4(a)] equipped with a GPS receiver that continuously 
recorded its position. The localization results are reported in Fig. 
4(b)-(c) where is also reported the main beam angular coverage 
of the PR antennas in yellow. 
In the first experiment [Fig. 4(b)], the aircraft moved on the 
runway just after landing travelling a distance of about 75 meters 
away from the receiver. In the second experiment [Fig. 4(c)], the 
same aircraft moved toward the taxiway from left to right. In 
both cases, we observe a good agreement with the available 
ground-truth and targets positions are estimated with good 
accuracy at least when they are included in the receiver antennas 
beamwidth.   
The third test was performed against two targets taken during 
a typical operative condition of the airfield. Specifically, a small 
aircraft, after leaving the hangar, was moving toward the 
taxiway (see the aircraft on the ground on the left side of Fig. 
5(a)). Contemporaneously, an ultralight aircraft, a powered 
paraglider, was flying over the runway involved in a ‘touch and 
go’ landing maneuver. Fig. 5(b) shows the PR localization 
results; in particular, the same colors of Fig. 3 are used to 
identify the two tracks once converted in Cartesian coordinate. 
As expected, in all cases, the target localization accuracy 
rapidly degrades as the aircraft gets far away from the PR 
receiver; basically this is due to the decrease in the target echo 
power level and to the widening of the uncertainty x-y area 
caused by a given DoA error. However, the results obtained with 
the adopted set-up show that the conceived system could be 
effective in monitoring aircraft activities occurring on and in the 
proximity of the runway in order to avoid accidents due to 
intentional/unintentional runway incursions.  
Moreover, in typical operative conditions, many people 
might be walking around different airfield areas. Therefore, 
aiming at improving safety and security in such scenarios, the 
capability to reliably detect, localize and track human targets 
might be crucial.  
This possibility is proved in this last reported test, where the 
PR sensor is operated against three people walking in the 
proximity of the airfield facilities (i.e. club-house, restaurant, 
etc.) along different trajectories [see Fig. 6(a)]. The PR results 
are reported in Fig. 6(b) where different colors are used to 
indicate different tracks. We note that the sensor is able to 
correctly identify and localize all the targets moving in the 
considered area. Moreover, for illustration purposes, ideal 
boundaries have been defined between an allowed area (close to 
the airfield facilities) and a forbidden area (adjacent to the 
runway) and the red color has been used for the tracks of the 
targets crossing the boundaries. Notice that the same approach 
can be exploited to prevent runway incursions by ill-intentioned 
people and wild animals living in neighboring areas. 
It should be noted that when there is a high concentration of 
targets moving in the surveyed area, the system could have some 
limitations because targets that move very close each other are 
Fig. 4. Test against a cooperative aircraft: (a) picture of the performed test; 
(b)–(c) PR results compared to the available ground-truth for a landing 
aircraft and for an aircraft near the runway, respectively. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Fig. 3. Detection over the Range-velocity plane for the test in Fig. 5. 
 not resolved neither in range nor in Doppler. If this is the case, 
Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) techniques can be 
applied to improve the resolution of the sensor in cross-range 
dimension as shown in [9]-[10].  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have investigate the effectiveness of a 
passive radar for enhancing the security level in small airports 
and private runways. Specifically a WiFi-based PR developed at 
SAPIENZA University of Rome has been exploited to perform 
detection and localization of non-cooperative targets that can be 
occupying the runway and the surrounding areas. The 
experimental tests performed in a small private airfield for 
light/ultralight airplanes have shown that the system is able to 
correctly detect and accurately track small and ultralight 
aircrafts and people. The results prove the effective applicability 
of the proposed system for small airports surveillance. 
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Fig. 5. Test against two maneuvering aircrafts: (a) picture of the performed 
test; (b) PR results compared to the available ground-truth. 
Fig. 6. Test against human targets: (a) picture of the performed test;  
(b) PR results employed for the security exercise. 
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